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B.: Deeds--Estoppel By Deed--Effect of Reference
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
that the court will refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment
or decree when such judgment, if rendered, would not terminate
the controversy, remove the uncertainty giving rise to the proceeding, or serve any useful purpose. Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla.
782, 128 So. 258 (1930); Cook v. Sikes, 210 Ga. 722, 82 S.E.2d 641
(1954); Jackson, A Note on Declaratory Judgment Pleading and
Practice, 48 W. VA. L.Q. 135 (1942). In Pantelides v. Pantelides,
54 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1945), it was held that the use of a declaratory
judgment, although discretionary, is dependent on circumstances
rendering it useful and necessary, and in absence of necessity for
resort thereto, it should not be employed; nor should it be used
where a full and adequate remedy is alreadr provided by another
well known form of action. Brindley v. Mdara, 209 Ind. 144, 198
N.E. 301 (1935); James v. Alderton Dock Yards, 256 N.Y. 298, 176
N.E. 401 (1931). See Somberg v. Somberg, 263 N.Y. 1, 188 N.E.
137 (1933).
Therefore, the general proposition that a "declaratory judgment action will lie to adjudicate custody" is qualified when such
proceeding is based on a factual situation equivalent to that found
in the principal case, due to the absence of an "actual controversy"
within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act, and the
action would serve no useful purpose inasmuch as a declaratory
judgment decree would not be entitled to any higher degree of
full faith and credit in the Minnesota courts than the original
custory award in Smith v. Smith, 76 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1953).

M. J. S.

DEEDs-ESTOPPEL BY DE D-EFFECT OF REFERENCE.-Father of
P was seised of a one-half undivided interest in tracts of land No. I
and 2, and mother of P was seised of the other one-half undivided
interest in tracts No. 1 and 2, and of the whole of tract No. 3. By
deed the father and mother conveyed to P the father's "undivided
interest" in the three tracts (the father's only apparent interest in
tract No. 3 being his inchoate dower right). By a later deed P
conveyed to D with covenants of general warranty, "all those certain tracts [ 1, 2, and 3] . . . of surface land situate on Peter Cave
and Bartram Fork Creek of Little Lynn Creek ... and being the
same land conveyed by Sarah B. Wellman [mother] and B. F.
Wellman [father], her husband . .. and bounded and described
as follows . . . ." There followed metes and bounds descriptions

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1955

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 2 [1955], Art. 13
CASE COMMENTS
of the three tracts. Subsequently the mother died intestate leaving
P as her sole heir, P taking thereby her undivided one-half interest
in tracts No. 1 and 2, and the whole of tract No. 8. P sued to
recover possession of tract No. 3, and for a partition of tracts No. I
and 2. Held, that by the terms employed by P in his deed to D, P
did not purport to convey an interest in futuro, but only the interest which he possessed in the property at that time; therefore P
was not estopped by deed to assert the title he subsequently acquired by inheritance. Wellman v. Tomblin, 84 S.E.2d 617 (W.
Va. 1954) (3-2 decision). (The father of P predeceased P's mother,
dying before the deed from P to D in question here. Petition for
appeal in case No. 10656, at p. 12; consequently when P made the
conveyance to D, P had no interest at all, in so far as appears, in
tract No. 3 because his father's inchoate dower right, which had
been conveyed to P, had been extinguished by the death of P's
father before the death of Ps mother).
As the dissenting opinion indicates, the propriety of this
decision turns on the quantum of interest intended to be conveyed
by the deed to D. In determining this, the intent of the parties, if
ascertainable, prevails; and, generally it is necessary to consider the
entire instrument in order to ascertain the intent. Id. at 620. By
the use of the word "all" and the metes and bounds description,
did the parties understand such to be merely a physical description
of the land conveyed, or did they intend and contemplate such
to mean the entire interest in the land conveyed?
To resolve this issue the majority opinion looked to the deed
referred to as the source of P's title as controlling. In so doing,
the court recognized the general rule of construction, that in cases
of doubt or ambiguity deeds will be construed most strongly
against the grantor and in favor of the grantee, to be the rule in
West Virginia. However, as an exception to or limitation upon
this general rule, the court repeats with approval the dictum in
Kent's Representatives v. Watson's Heirs, 22 W. Va. 561 (1883),
that "an estoppel is never extended beyond what is called for by
the plain import of the terms employed by the grantor in a conveyance of any kind." Id. at 568. The court, however, does not
explain the "plain import" of the metes and bounds description
of tract No. 3, or the seemingly apparent intention of the parties
to deal at least to some extent with tract No. 3. Note that P had
no interest whatsoever, so far as can be determined, in tract No. 8
when the deed to D was executed. The entire description in a
deed should be considered in determining the land conveyed and
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the intention of the parties in this regard; and effect should be
given to every part of the description, if possible. Stephenson v.
Kuntz, 131 W. Va. 599, 612, 49 S.E.2d 235, 242 (1948); McConaughey v. Holt, 102 W. Va. 290, 135 S.E. 282 (1926).
In considering the deed referred to determinative, the court
cites with approval Carter's Adm'r v. Quillen, 239 Ky. 583, 39
S.W.2d 1012 (1931), to the effect that "where the reference is
intended to show more than merely the source of title, it may
require the grantee to resort to the deed referred to in order to
determine the extent of his acquisition." (Italics supplied.) What
determines when the reference is intended to show more than
source of title. The reference back in the deed construed in the
Quillen case concluded: ".... to which reference is hereby made for
a more definite and particular description of the said lands. .. "
Id. at 584, 39 S.W.2d at 1012. The court in the Quillen case
quotes with approval from Perry v. Buswell, 113 Me. 399, 94 Atl.
483, 484 (1915) as follows: "References to prior conveyances are
made for varying purposes. They are made sometimes for the
purpose of showing the source of title, sometimes to show the identity of the land conveyed; sometimes, and generally by way of
caution, to afford a more definite description. It is probably true
that in the larger number of cases the reference is made to show
source of title." (Italics supplied.) In Remuda Oil Co. v. Wilson,
264 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex. 1954), the court, commenting on the
Quillen case, supra, stated in part: "In that case the court noted
that references to prior conveyances are made for varying purposes
and that for such a reference to have the effect there held [be controlling] it must be clear that the reference is for the purpose of
affording a definite description." (Italics supplied.) In the Remuda
Oil case the court found a reference expressly stated in the deed to
be for "all purposes" to have such effect. In Clark v. Roller, 104
Va. 472, 51 S.E. 816 (1905), the court, in holding that the reference
to the deed by which the grantor derived his title did not control,
stated in part: "It is clear, we think, from the language of the deed,
that the entire tract . . . of land conveyed by Stover to Hall was
conveyed by him [Hall] to the plaintiff, and that the language of
the old deed, viz., 'to which the said ... Hall has legal title under
conveyances from... Coleman and ... Haviland. . .' relied on by
the defendant to show that only so much of the tract was intended
to be conveyed as was actually within the limits of the old grant
of Coleman and Haviland, was not intended to describe the interest or amount of land conveyed, but was used for the purpose
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of showing from what source the land was derived, and as a help
to trace the title." The court went on to state that, if the

language in the deed did leave any ambiguity, it would have to
be resolved in favor of the grantee under the rule of construction

that deeds are construed most strongly against the grantor and in
favor of the grantee.
In the case of Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kingston Bank
& Trust Co., 172 Tenn. 335, 112 S.W.2d 381 (1938), the land conveyed by the deed of trust wias described by reference to natural
objects and adjoining tracts, and by a somewhat defective metes
and bounds description, and the description concluded: "and being
the same property conveyed to ... Brown by... Johnson by deed
dated October 26, 1905, and which is of record . . . and also the
same property conveyed to . . . Brown by . . . Crumblin . . . by
deed dated October 26, 1905, which is of record. . ." The tract
of land described by the reference to natural objects and adjoining
tracts, which description the court held superseded the defective
metes and bounds description, was found to include land conveyed
to Brown by deeds other than those to which reference had been
made. Kingston Bank & Trust Company contended that the reference to the previous deeds was controlling in the description,
and that the land conveyed by the deed was only that acquired by
Brown by the deeds to which reference had been made. The court
in holding otherwise, stated that there was no specific reference for
description to earlier deeds in the deed of Brown that was before
it for construction; that there was only a general reference to the
two earlier deeds, and the reference may have been merely to show
the chain of title. The court further stated: "It has been rather
generally held that a particular description of the property and estate conveyed, which is definite and certain, will control a general
reference to another deed as the source of title." The description in
this case seems no more certain than that in the West Virginia
case here under consideration. In Jones v. Webster Woolen Co.,
85 Me. 210, 27 Atl. 105 (1892), the description was in essence as
follows: A certain lot or parcel of land situated in Lewiston on
Sabatties Stream, and with certain stated boundaries, and being
the same agreed to be conveyed by me to Bleakie, by an agreement
of a certain date, and recorded in a certain record book. The
description in the agreement referred to was of a lesser parcel of the
same land that was described in this deed. In holding that the
description in the deed controlled the court stated in part: ". . .The
reference is general, rather than particular,and was designed to
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identify locality, rather than to make more certain any limits or
bounds in the deed. It would be a hazardous policy to allow a
grantor to lessen the amount of land apparently conveyed by his
deed by a general reference to some other deed or paper. Imposition could be easily practiced under such a rule, as grantees rarely
pay much attention to such references, or know whether they affect
their interests or not." (Italics supplied.)
It is admitted that the cases considered in this comment are
not specifically pointed toward the quantum of interest conveyed.
The cases seem to make no distinction between quantum of interest and physical quantity of land in so far as the descriptive
language used is concerned. Our court states that the intention of
the parties controls as to the quantum of interest conveyed. There
seems to be no reason why the same language should not manifest
the same intention as to quantum of interest that it manifests toward physical quantity of land. The cases seem to draw a line as
to the effect of such a reference back between a general reference
and a specific or particular reference, holding particular references
to be controlling, but not giving such weight to a general reference. For a reference to be particular there apparently must be
some language in addition to a bare statement of source of title,
from which the court can find an intention of the grantor to include
the document referred to within the present description. On this
basis, it appears that the West Virginia court has given a general
reference a controlling effect. The possible consequences of such
a decision seem adequately pointed out in the quoted portion from
the Webster Woolen Co. case, supra.
J. K. B.

DIVORCE-FUTURE INSTALLMENTS OF ALIMONY OR MAINTENANCE

AUTOMATIC LIEN.-In a vendors' action for specific performance
and to quiet title with regard to an alleged defect founded upon
a decree for divorce and maintenance money for the support of
minor children, the Iowa court held than an installment or support
money judgment does not constitute an automatic lien upon real
estate for future unpaid installments. Slack v. Mullenix, 66
N.W.2d 99 (Iowa, 1954).
The cases throughout the United States are in conflict as to
whether a decree for alimony or maintenance money will in itself
operate as a lien on the defendant's realty. -That the decree will
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